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## PANCHSHEEL PARTNERS

### INDIA AND CHINA MAKE A NEW BEGINNING

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#### ABSTRACT

Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao's visit to India in April 2005 raised India-China relations to a new level which is likely to contribute to Asian cooperation and accelerate peace processes in the continent. China recognises the emergence of India as an important country and both countries realise the costs of their indifferent relations in the past. The two countries declared their new relationship as "strategic and cooperative partnership" and adopted an 11-point agreement on political parameters for the overall settlement of the long pending boundary question. Shift from a legal historical approach to a political solution of the boundary dispute was a breakthrough. This process is greatly driven by the increasing momentum to India-China trade which grew from US\$3 billion in 2000 to 13 billion in 2004. The target is to reach 30 billion in 2010. The global significance of India-China cooperation will be felt not only in WTO and UN but at all the multilateral organisations. However, two competing models are being debated in the Indian security discourse - one seeking Indo-US partnership to counterbalance China and another promoting multiple partnerships expanding mutual cooperation and peace and development for all. It is the latter which is based on the Panchsheel and Bandung principles of equality and mutual benefit. They call upon the Asian countries to come together as panchsheel partners.

#### Preface

The Joint Statement issued on 11 April 2005 by the Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh and the Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao marking the latter's three day visit to India announced that the Premier's "highly successful State visit marked a new level of India-China relationship and opened a new chapter in the friendly relations and cooperation between the two countries."<sup>1</sup> Indeed, it marked a new stage in the relationship between the two countries because both parties decided to adopt a new approach to their relations - a political approach based on the principle of mutual respect and equality that aims at arriving at arrangements that benefit both the sides. This political approach was

announced to handle the long-standing boundary question. The new approach was meant to govern the whole spectrum of bilateral relations as well as their role in regional and global spheres.

The spirit of Panchsheel – the five principles of peaceful coexistence co-authored by India, China and Burma in 1954 whose golden jubilee was observed in 2004 in both the countries was evident on this occasion. Besides, Wen's visit took place on the eve of the fiftieth anniversary of the Bandung conference of Afro-Asian nations.<sup>2</sup> Though unfortunately there was no reference to Bandung during this trip, Panchsheel loomed large in the Joint Statement as well as the Agreement on the guiding principles for boundary settlement.

Inter-state relationship based on the Panchsheel framework stresses the principle of equality among states - the five principles being respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, non-interference in internal affairs, non-aggression, equality and mutual benefit and peaceful coexistence. Reaffirmation of this perspective in the post-cold war period and in the post-9/11 environment which saw US invasions on Afghanistan and Iraq was extremely significant. As people's consciousness for autonomy, dignity and better livelihood grows all over the world, from grassroots level upwards these principles acquire even greater significance and societies and nations gear up their efforts to cope with challenges of globalisation and hegemony. Therefore affirmation of Panchsheel opens the door towards a democratic international order.

## **1. China's new Perception of India**

This approach emerges from a new Chinese acknowledgement of India as a rising force in the global arena with which China has to come to terms to face the new strategic and economic environment. Until the late 1980s China's foreign policy priorities focused on the super powers. In the early nineties China began to diversify its markets and was adjusting her foreign policy to cope with a new world environment dominated by the US. By the time of the visit of President Jiang Zemin to India and Pakistan in late 1996 a new trend was visible indicating a shift in Chinese policy. Without affecting their close relationship with Pakistan, China began to attach significance to its relationship with India. This was evident during the Kargil conflict in 1999 when China refrained from supporting Pakistan. The economic reforms in India after 1991 which achieved an impressive rate of growth and above all the great successes of India in IT software as well as the rise of an Indian professional class with world class competence contributed to the new Chinese perception of India. Problems of poverty, unemployment, regional disparity, social inequality and environmental degradation in the Indian political economy are exactly the ones the present leadership of China had identified as their most significant problems. In fact, Premier Wen Jiabao highlighted them in his report to the third session of the tenth National People's Congress in March. Moreover, political instability, secessionist movements, terrorist activities which are often publicised in case of India have to be understood in the perspective of a continuing process of transformation. China too was facing many of these problems despite its great achievements in economic growth. Way back in 1980 China's leader Deng Xiaoping had said that China should learn from India in the areas of higher education and agricultural technology. Today both countries have much to learn from each other. This was the note in Wen Jiabao's speeches everywhere from IISc, Bangalore to the IIT, Delhi. As the Beijing Review Editorial of 8 April 2005 put it, India and China had failed to communicate with each other in the past decades and looked like

strangers to each other instead of neighbours and now China had made a “perceptual leap” realising that “India was actually an outstanding classmate next door”.<sup>3</sup>

Classmates do compete, but it is a healthy competition in a school where every student wishes to graduate into the new world of opportunities. Therefore, the talk of “rivals”, “adversaries”, “cut throat competitors”, “clash of nationalisms”, “Asian giants face to face”, “the Chinese checkers against India” was not altogether absent in the media, but there was a widespread recognition of the new environment of mutual respect. Wen Jiabao referred to India often as not only as a populous country but also one of the most important developing countries. Both Wen and Manmohan Singh placed the present phase of the relationship in a wider historical perspective of over two thousand years of interaction. This time it did not sound as a cliché. Both countries were finally speaking as civilisational societies engaged in a dialogue with enormous responsibilities to the future generations.

## **2. Strategic Partnership**

Announcing in the Joint Statement that India-China relations had “now acquired a global and strategic character” the two sides agreed to establish a “strategic and cooperative partnership for peace and security”. This was a step forward from the Joint Declaration of 2003 signed by Prime Minister Vajpayee in Beijing when the relations were characterised as “constructive and cooperative partnership”. The new term, strategic implied that the two countries were involved not only in bilateral, but also regional and global issues ranging from nuclear to counter-terrorism, global warming to WTO and so on. It also meant widening the dimensions of cooperation integrating political, economic, technological and cultural spheres and giving it a strategic push.<sup>4</sup>

The Chinese Premier undertook a 8 day South Asia tour that began in Pakistan on 5 April and ended in India on 12 April after covering Bangla Desh and Sri Lanka. Wen Jiabao signed a Treaty of Friendship with Pakistan establishing “strategic partnership” as well with that country. The treaty stipulates that each will support the other in any situation threatening their unity, sovereignty and territorial integrity. With the other two it was described as “comprehensive cooperative partnership”. In this way all the four neighbours were satisfied. Wen signed 22 agreements in Pakistan including the ones setting up a nuclear power plant in Chasma, and developing the Gwadar port in Balochistan and finalising the co-production of JF-17 thunder warplanes. Pakistan’s strategic significance for China has grown further as China seeks an energy corridor to West Asia. Indian commentators however, were not too obsessed this time with China-Pakistan partnership. After all, India too was seriously engaged in building peace and cooperative relations with Pakistan. In fact, Wen Jiabao’s programme had to compete for press coverage with the on-going Pak-India cricket series and the preparation for General Musharaf’s visit scheduled a few days later on the 17<sup>th</sup>, besides the 18<sup>th</sup> congress of CPM. In Sri Lanka Wen visited the Tsunami-devastated areas with a fresh planeload of relief. Bangla Desh provided a red carpet welcome to the leader from the country which was described by Prime Minister Khaleda Zia as Bangla Desh’s best friend.

Some Indian commentators felt that the fact that Premier Wen clubbed the India visit with visits to three other countries indicated that China did not attach adequate significance to India and it treated India only as a regional power in South Asia. That may be partially true. But it should be noted that India’s rising significance in the global arena was

acknowledged by China in no uncertain terms. The political significance of the agreements signed during Wen's visit does not make it a routine visit to the sub-continent. Even though he is not the top leader of China and is only the effective second person in command, the outcome was considered historic. Moreover, the Chinese leaders generally visit clusters of countries. Incidentally, Wen Jiabao did not include Nepal in his itinerary while his Foreign Minister visited Kathmandu thus balancing Indian sentiments with the Chinese official position treating the royal coup as an "internal affair." Summing up Wen's trip to South Asia in his interaction with the correspondents accompanying the Premier on 13 April the Chinese Foreign Minister Li Zhaoxing said that it fulfilled the goal of "strengthening trust, deepening friendship, expanding cooperation and planning for the future." That there was a new seriousness about the region as a whole in China's policy framework was evident in Li's statement that "development of China was closely linked with the welfare of South Asia".<sup>5</sup> ( People's Daily-on-line 13 April 2005). China needed the vast market across the Himalayas and also raw materials and that was possible only in a framework of 'win-win' cooperation that benefited all the partners. Premier Wen also addressed the fourth ministerial meeting of ACD ( Asian Cooperation Dialogue ) in Islamabad on 5 April reaffirming China's commitment to multilateral cooperation among Asian countries. On that occasion the Pakistan Prime Minister of Pakistan spoke of the vision of an Asian Free Trade Area.

That India-China "strategic partnership" was not aimed against any third country was indicated by saying that it was for achieving "peace and prosperity". Thus neither should it be construed as anti-US nor anti-Pakistan. In fact, Indo-US relations which was set on a strategic partnership road by the NDA regime has evolved steadily under the UPA. US Secretary of State Condoleeza Rice had visited New Delhi a few days before Wen did and Indian Foreign Minister Natwar Singh left for Washington a day after receiving the Chinese Premier.

There are two competing scenarios in action. One is the US strategy of building up close bonds with India and India's with Japan to neutralise China's rising influence. There are many takers for this line among India's strategic planners. US offer of co-producing F-18 in India, sharing nuclear power technology by lifting the remaining sanctions and the well-publicised US announcement to "help in the rise of India as a global power" are part of this line of thought. They take China's close relationship with Pakistan and other neighbours of India as "encirclement of India" which should be countered with US help. They took glee with the fact that India-China Joint Statement did not refer to supporting the Anti-Secession Law recently passed in China's NPC while it was mentioned in all the other joint statements that Wen signed in the three other countries.

The alternative thinking suggested going for multiple or concurrent partnerships. India should establish as close relationships as possible with the US as well which is the storehouse of finance capital and technology in the world today. It should also strengthen partnerships with Russia, China, Japan and EU as well as with other countries. The Japanese Prime Minister Koizumi was scheduled to visit India at the end of April. The concurrent partnership approach goes beyond the parameters of balance of power reminiscent of the cold war and builds up maximum resource bases for global and regional operations. This involves a focus on multilateral formations in regional as well as political-economic levels. Wen Jiabao warmly supported the China-India-Russia trilateral initiative which had enormous potential for cooperation on energy, environment, transport as well as regional security. The IBSA Forum that India, Brazil and South Africa have launched whose second meeting was held in Pretoria in March has been hailed as an initiative of the developing countries for multilateral cooperation. But it is not only for the major powers to come together in various combinations, but countries of all sizes and resource levels which may be interconnected within the

framework of concurrent partnerships. This idea also flows out of the Panchsheel concept of equality and mutual benefit. China has practised this successfully to create an environment of peace for its development and also to get access to the market in every part of the world. China's own relationship with the US is also of intense closeness in trade, investment as well as political dialogue. This is so despite their serious differences over Taiwan.

### **3. Political Approach to the Boundary Question**

The most significant advance made in India-China relations accomplished during the Wen Jiabao visit was recorded in the Agreement on Political Parameters and Guiding Principles for the Settlement of the India-China Boundary Question. This embodies a transition from the legal-historical approach to a political approach and puts the negotiations on the border on a new plane. Chinese Foreign Minister Li Zhaoxing described it as “the first political document in the past 20 years for resolving the boundary issue”.<sup>6</sup> Actually an important step in this direction was taken during Vajpayee's visit in June 2003 when the two sides agreed to appoint Special Representatives ‘to explore solutions to the boundary question from a political perspective’. Thereafter the Chinese Representative, Vice Foreign Minister Dai Bingguo had conducted two rounds of discussions with Brijesh Mishra, the National Security Advisor during the NDA regime and two rounds with J N Dixit until his death after the UPA came to power and a fifth round with Dixit's successor M K Narayanan which clinched this agreement on the eve of Wen Jiabao's visit. But it should also be noted that the first political breakthrough came during Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi's visit in 1988 when he set out the new framework of simultaneously building up relations on economic and cultural fronts while discussing the boundary issue through a Joint Working Group (JWG).<sup>7</sup> The historic meeting between Rajiv Gandhi and Deng Xiaoping then had articulated the vision of India and China working together for making the twentieth century an Asian century. But, let alone take up substantive issues of claims of each side, the JWG could not make much progress on the clarification of the Line of Actual Control (LAC) so that it could become a Line of Control as in case of the J & K. However, the JWG was an important forum to exchange views on a variety of issues and it has facilitated the expansion of economic and cultural relations to the present level. It would continue to work under the new framework..

Thus it has been a long process involving successive governments of India.<sup>8</sup> That the present Agreement has been welcomed by all political parties shows that there is a national consensus in India on a political approach to the border settlement. Prime Minister Manmohan Singh had consultations with the NDA and the Left parties prior to Wen's visit. Wen also called on the Leader of the Opposition L K Advani.

The 11 point Agreement on political parameters has three sets of principles. First, after an affirmation of the Panchsheel and respect of mutual concerns and equal security there is a clear statement that “differences over the boundary question shall not be allowed to affect the overall development of bilateral relations”. It also commits the two sides not to use or threaten to use force against the other by any means.( Art I). There is a key provision on give and take when it says that that “both sides should, in the spirit of mutual respect and mutual understanding , make meaningful and mutually acceptable adjustments to their respective positions... so as to arrive at a package settlement...( which) must be final covering all the sectors..” ( Art III). This focus on a package settlement is a crucial

advance over the sector by sector approach which had bogged down the negotiators. This allows an overall realistic view that respects India's claim over Arunachal and China's over Aksai Chin while at the same time making adjustments on specific points which the political representatives backed by national political authority can discuss. The Zhou Enlai offer to Nehru in 1960 or the Deng Xiaoping's mention of it in 1980 to a visiting Indian journalist or the present discourse on "realistic adjustments" have acquired serious meaning after this Agreement.<sup>9</sup>

The second set of principles relate to detailing some geo-political considerations for negotiations and settlement. China's border negotiations with 11 of its neighbours had reached this stage very early which facilitated their final settlement. In course of the deliberations, the Agreement says, the "two sides shall take into account, *inter alia*, historical evidence, national sentiments, practical difficulties and reasonable concerns and sensitivities of both sides, and the actual state of border areas." (Art V) Equally important are the principles of seeking "well-defined and easily identifiable geographical features" and "safeguarding the interests of their settled populations". These principles contain a huge body of considerations relating to specific points on the border as well as large populated or unpopulated areas besides the places of cultural and religious significance. The settled population of Arunachal State can be justified as an Indian territory irrespective of the legality of the Macmahon line drawn by the Shimla Conference of 1914 which the Chinese refuse to recognise. On the other hand, the Chinese interest in Tawang Monastery as a Tibetan religious citadel may not persuade India to hand over a territory which is integrated with Indian cultural and economic life. But there may be possibilities of opening the border for religious and economic purposes.

The third set of principles chalks out a stage by stage process. After applying these parameters to the boundary as a whole, the Special Representatives will present a framework for settlement in the second stage on the basis of which delineation and demarcation of the boundary will be undertaken by civil and military officials and surveyors of the two sides in the third and final stage. There is a supporting Protocol on Confidence Building Measures signed by the two sides which expands those CBMs agreed in 1993 in Beijing during Prime Minister Narasimha Rao's visit and in 1996 in Delhi during President Jiang Zemin's visit. They have ensured peace and tranquility on the LAC. Perhaps that is why there is no time table for this process. But there is a sense of urgency to sort out this long pending problem. The post-colonial states are especially sensitive about their territorial identity, just as China is about Taiwan and India about J&K. But once the issue is settled the same countries turn it into soft border or a line of peace and cooperation. The settlement can also be facilitated by cross border trade and travel as well. This Agreement still requires a strong political commitment to carry forward the negotiations which is possible in a situation of favourable public opinion. But cold war mentality still pervades in many quarters. Fortunately, in contemporary India there is a growing arena of people's initiatives for peace in Asia. There lies some optimism.

#### **4. Trade as a Driver**

There has been much talk about economic forces now driving India-China relations. Truly enough, this impression arises from the rapid rise in the trade volume from about US\$3 billion in 2000 to some \$13.6 billion in 2004. The economic reforms of India and China have common grounds of mutual appreciation which have provided an impetus to their interaction.<sup>10</sup> Indian business groups are also entering the China market for investment in a big way

and Chinese investors are beginning to set up enterprises in India. In the IT sector India's software industry and China's hardware industry are among the world leaders. In fact, Premier Wen Jiabao began his India visit from Bangalore the software capital of India. Talking of complementarity of the two economies, he described India as the office ( *bangongshe* ) and China as the factory ( *gongchang* ) which can work together to the advantage of each other. It might have been an appropriate description of the present ( though Indian professionals may like to be positioned in the Board room or the control room ). But surely enough, Chinese professional class is growing fast as also its software industry and India is also determined to develop its manufacturing sector. Thus the structural gap between manufacture-centred Chinese economy and the service-oriented Indian economy should be gradually reduced if not bridged in the future. But more importantly, there are debates in both the countries about how to achieve social goals together with economic growth. For that a harmonious combination of primary, secondary and tertiary sectors, of agriculture, industry and service may be necessary rather than mechanically following the Western trajectory of development of going ultimately to knowledge economy and derisively treating agriculture and manufacture. For populous agrarian societies seeking socially just and environmentally sustainable development both the countries have to cooperate in evolving their own paths of development by learning from each other.

The Report of the Joint Study Group ( JSG ) on Trade and Economic Cooperation set up in 2003 was adopted by the two governments. It spells out a wide ranging set of opportunities for economic cooperation and identifies the problems that have to be tackled. Like Premier Zhu Rongji who had set the target of US\$10 billion for India-China trade during his visit in 2002, the two Prime Ministers announced a target of \$20 billion for 2008 and \$30 billion by 2010. The actual progress in trade may even be higher considering the experience of the past five years. But on the question of India-China Regional Trade Agreement which the JSG had recommended the two Prime Ministers decided to set up a Task Force. Indian business community was still not ready for this as they think that the Chinese will have much greater advantage in that situation. This is comparable to the complaints of Pakistani producers vis-à-vis India. For the same reason the Indian government was persuaded not to accord the status of "market economy" to China. Indian government is slowly getting into regional and multilateral modes of cooperation and in not too distant future it is likely to welcome more and more free trade agreements.

The two sides signed a number of agreements, MOU or Protocols on customs matters, financial dialogue, Sanitary and Phyto-Sanitary requirements for Indian export of bitter gourds and grapes to China. Many others were in the pipeline including Chinese import of basmati rice from India. But only when Indian manufactured goods and services get into the Chinese market in larger quantity, Indian entrepreneurs will be happy. The civil aviation agreement charting out an increased number of flights and destinations in the two countries would facilitate greater cooperation.

When Wen Jiabao addressed the meeting organised by the CII and FICCI on 12 April in Delhi the absence of many top captains of industry was noticed. Some had met him in Bangalore. One interpretation was that this trip was focused on political relationship which was the key to continuing the overall trend of cooperation. Another was that the business circles now had their own channels of operation with the opening up of the economies. In any case the centrality of the political relationship cannot be underestimated. Even in case of the China-US relations where business plays such an important part political interventions decide the course of development. However, it is true that interests of business and people's pressures today influence government policy more than ever before.

## 5. Civilizations and Powers

During the visit of Wen Jiabao Indian public discourse possessed two strands of thought. One was the voice of a civilisational society looking at two thousand years' history and looking forward to a long term future of humanity in Asia and the world and treating China also as a civilisational society of a similar order and trying to translate values into policy and action.<sup>11</sup>The other was the voice of a security conscious nation-state engaging in a power calculus in a game of balance of power – a state that treated others also as similar actors, big and small trying to acquire resources as launching pads for greater power.

Take for example, the issue of India seeking permanent membership in the UN Security Council. The Indian press front-paged a report on 12 April saying that the Chinese Premier had announced its support for the Indian bid. But the very next day, asked about it in the press conference Wen only repeated the relevant portion from the Joint Statement that it “understands and supports India’s aspirations to play an active role in the UN and international affairs”. This was the time when anti-Japanese demonstrations were increasing in Chinese cities over the Japanese textbooks which had infuriated the Chinese by not mentioning about the massacres by the Japanese troops in Nanjing and elsewhere during the Sino-Japanese War. India, Japan, Germany and Brazil had formed the group of four aspirants for the UN permanent seats. A few days before Wen’s trip Italy, South Korea and Pakistan had taken the initiative to organise a meeting of 130 countries on 31 March to oppose these proposals. Later the Chinese Ambassador informed the Government of India that the Chinese Government had decided to support India’s claim, but did not formally announce it because of its opposition to Japan and would declare it when the time comes ( The Times of India, 20 April 2005 ). While UK, France and Russia had already endorsed India’s claim, the US still had not though it had talked about India’s emergence as a global actor. US had so far openly supported Japan’s candidature and called for a consensus on the names.

A civilisational society does not go about lobbying for the UN seat in this fashion. It should deserve it on the basis of its domestic and international achievements. In fact, India was committed to restructuring the UN system to democratise it and transform its character as an oligopoly into a participant body where developing countries played an important role.. The India-China Joint Statement does talk about the establishment of a new international political and economic order that is fair, rational, equal and mutually beneficial . This was reminiscent of the values of Bandung Declaration of the Asian and African countries of 1955. But the Joint Statement did not follow this perspective in all respects. On fighting terrorism even though the two governments stressed the need to strengthen the global legal framework against terrorism – an indirect admission of how the sole super power US had bypassed the UN and violated international law- there was no mention of the need to go into the roots of terrorism . Hopefully this would be taken up in their periodic strategic dialogue. Civilisational societies become successful as modern states when they achieve civilisational goals through the instrumentalities of the new political environment. The decisions on building an Indian style Buddhist Temple in Luoyang, setting up a film cooperation commission, establishment of the Confucius Institute in Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi and raising the number of scholarships for the youth from the existing miserable number of 21 to 100 – if the report is correct- give us the hope that civilisations are indeed alive in dialogue.

But the most significant effect of the new political understanding between India and China may be its contribution to regional integration and peace in Asia. The peace and cooperation process in South Asia will be facilitated with China's positive approach to that trend. In the past, India's neighbours looked upon China to counter-balance India's domineering influence over the region. India's increasingly more active participation in ASEAN framework can get aided by this development. This is especially crucial in the context of the East Asian Summit scheduled in late 2005. As a result of the new understanding India, together with Pakistan and Iran were already invited to the June Summit of the SCO ( Shanghai Cooperation Organisation). It was reported that this could be in return for accepting China as an observer in SAARC though there was no clear announcement on it thus far. The trilateral forum of India, China and Russia which was limited to academic conferences and informal get-togethers of governmental representatives acquired a major official character with the first formal meeting of the three Foreign Ministers in Vladivostok on 2 June 2005. This was acclaimed as mainly a forum for cooperation on energy, trade and counter-terrorism and not aimed against any other country. The four country cooperation connecting China's southwest and India's northeast in the form of the BCIM ( Bangladesh, China, India and Myanmar ) has completed one round of interaction and has now acquired greater interest from their respective governments. Pan Asian efforts, such as Asian Cooperation Dialogue, CICA ( the Almaty based Convention on International Cooperation in Asia ) and the Boao Forum for Asia among others may see greater cooperation among the two major countries in the coming years. In the WTO and the UN's economic, health and environmental for a China and India were already coordinating their policies as the two leading developing countries.

Yet it would be impractical to ignore some issues that may adversely affect this process . Firstly, the India-China boundary dispute is far from resolved and remains a sensitive issue, though there is peace and tranquility on the border. Second, Sino-Pakistan relations, especially their nuclear and missile collaboration continues to create anxiety among India's security planners. However, there is much greater confidence with which the Indian and the Chinese governments handle this issue now. Third, Tibetans in India, especially Dalai Lama's government-in-exile remains a delicate political issue even though Indian government has handled it more or less to the satisfaction of the Chinese. But the most significant factor is the fourth. The global political and economic process led by the US may not encourage the two rising economies of Asia coming close as an important political force in the emerging world. On the contrary, the US strategy may be trying to forge a kind of alliance with India and Japan to counter-balance the rise of China – a strategy that has many takers in India. But the forces of peace, development and democratic rights all over the world are becoming stronger day by day seeking justice, dignity and better livelihood for all groups and challenging hegemony within countries, regions and the world. Therefore, regional cooperation through bilateral agreements and multilateral organizations and restructuring the global economic and political order to make it fair and democratic are the main trends of the contemporary world. Therefore countries big and small are building win-win relationships that are based on the principles of equality and mutual benefit. That was the spirit of the Panchasheel and Bandung Declarations half a century ago which have an even greater meaning in the new age of freedom and self-determination in the twenty first century.<sup>12</sup> That is why India and China, the Panchsheel partners have made a new beginning to cope with a new world environment. Indeed, all countries of Asia should aim at becoming Panchasheel partners.

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<sup>1</sup>.Joint Statement of Premier Wen Jiabao and Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, **The Hindu** ( New Delhi, 13 April 2005 )

<sup>2</sup>**India- China cooperation provides a major impetus for Asian integration. See Manoranjan Mohanty, "Panchasheel Vision and Asian Cooperation" in C V Ranganathan ( ed ) Panchasheel and the Future ( New Delhi: Sanskriti, 2004 )**

<sup>3</sup> **Beijing Review** ( 8 April 2005 )

<sup>4</sup> See Alka Acharya, Wen Jiabao' visit to South Asia, *Economic and Political weekly* ( 19 May 2005 )

<sup>5</sup> . **People's Daily - on line** 13 April 2005

<sup>6</sup> Ibid.

<sup>7</sup> . Need for a comprehensive political approach to India-China relations has been advocated for a long time by Mira Sinha Bhattacharjea, **China the World and India** ( New Delhi: Sanskriti, 2001 ),

<sup>8</sup> . Need for a comprehensive political approach to India-China relations has been advocated for a long time by Mira Sinha Bhattacharjea, **China the World and India** ( New Delhi: Sanskriti, 2001 ),

<sup>9</sup> **See Manoranjan Mohanty, Panchasheel to Panchasheel : Fifty Years of India-China Relations in K N Bakshi and F Scialpi ( Eds) , India 1947-1997 : Fifty Years of Independence ( Rome : Institute of Oriental and African Studies,2002)**

<sup>10</sup> Arvinder Singh, , Engagement through trade, **The Tribune**, (Chandigarh , 27 May 2005 )

<sup>11</sup> This perspective is emphasized by G P Deshpande, *China and the International System*. On the other hand, C V Ranganathan and Surjit Mansingh point out the nation-state dimensions in China's foreign policy in G P Deshpande and Alka Acharya ( eds), *Crossing the River of Dreams- Fifty Years of India and China* ( New Delhi: Tulika, 2001 )

<sup>12</sup> **Manoranjan Mohanty, "Panchasheel Vision and Asian Cooperation" op.cit.**

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